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ABSTRACT
The government of Indonesia had to reduce its development budget in 1986, and many
sectors, including infrastructure services, were seriously affected. Many government
officials believed that the government will no longer be able to provide the services
without private-sector participation. Due to its financial difficulties, the government
invited the private sector to participate in the provision of water for Surabaya and its
surrounding cities. Officials in Surabaya started the project in 1988 and are presently
conducting negotiations concerning it, but, at present, they have not yet started to
implement it.
The experience of privatizing the water-supply industry in some industrial and
developing countries shows that an adequate regulatory framework and an effective
regulatory institution are essential to create a competitive environment in a market
characterized by a natural monopoly. Regulations and competition are necessary to
achieve the privatization goals and public-welfare objectives.
The Indonesian experience in privatizing its water services confirms that without an
appropriate regulatory framework to guide the implementation of a privatization
program, there is a tendency for the private monopoly to exploit the market. To ensure
that the privatization program in the water-supply industry is successful, there should be
specific guidelines for technical requirements, an accounting system, environmental
safety measures, price determination, a legal procedure, and contractual arrangements.
Thesis Supervisor: Karen R. Polenske
Title: Professor of Regional Political Economy and Planning
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The provision of drinking water-supply services in Indonesia has been shared
mostly by the central government and local governments. The central government
provides drinking-water directly in both rural and urban areas, through the Ministry of
Public Works (MPW), where water enterprises have not yet been established, while
local governments provide the service through the operation of water enterprises.' At
this moment, water enterprises exist in both large and secondary cities where there are
adequate resources and demand.
In its Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun V,
or REPELITA V), from the fiscal year of 1988/89 through 1993/94, the government of
Indonesia determined that all urban areas that are already operating water enterprises
must serve at least 80% of their population by 1994. To achieve this target, these city
governments have to be able to mobilize a substantial amount of financial resources
through grants, borrowing, or private-sector participation. The last option may take the
form of full privatization (in water treatment, distribution, and fee collection), or public-
private partnerships. Central-government grants will still be provided to cities in
developing provinces.
Privatization is becoming more popular in many countries, especially industrial
countries. International agencies and some industrial countries, through their bilateral
Water enterprise is defined as a company, owned by a local government, that
provides drinking-water to a local community.
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development agencies, keep promoting privatization all around the world. In Indonesia,
privatization is viewed as being a breakthrough for the country's infrastructure
development policies. Some ministries and business people are in favor of extending
privatization to the provision of traditional public services, such as water supply,
telecommunication, electricity, transportation, and solid-waste management. This thesis
is about the experience of the Indonesian government in implementing its privatization
policy for the water-supply industry, and it includes an evaluation of the conditions
required to conduct the policy under an inadequate regulatory framework.
Need for Private-Sector Participation
Infrastructure development is still one of the most important policies for the
Indonesian government. Rapid economic and population growth create a high demand
for infrastructure services, and in many Indonesian cities, the demand exceeds the
supply of such services. Consistent with the government's policy, infrastructure
expenditure is the largest expenditure in the national budget, and it grows substantially
each fiscal year. The central government's financial situation, however, is limited. The
government has adopted a balanced-budget policy since 1966. Historically, the most
important source of the central government's revenues was from oil and gas exports. In
1986, the government's financial situation deteriorated, because world oil prices fell
sharply, and the sources of revenues in Indonesia from other sectors were very limited.
The 1986/1987 national budget was a no-growth budget, which meant that development
expenditures had to be reduced by 12% in real terms. The expenditures for
infrastructure development were among the most seriously affected (Sumadi, 1986).
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The main economic development policy since 1986 has been to stabilize the
exchange rate by expanding the government's sources of revenues and postponing many
governmental mega projects.2 Project postponement occurred in all sectors. In the
meantime, a strong belief developed among some government ministries that the central
government could no longer provide infrastructure services by itself, despite its effort to
increase revenues.
An obvious example of the central government's inability to provide
infrastructure services is in the water-supply industry. The provision of urban and rural
drinking-water supply has been an important infrastructure development program of the
Indonesian government since 1969, the commencement of REPELITA I.3 Substantial
investments in water-supply services have been made. In REPELITA III, local water
enterprises (Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum, or PDAM) and drinking-water management
boards' (Badan Pengelola Air Minum, or BPAM) coverage in urban areas was only
23% of the total population, among the lowest in Asia (World Bank, 1991). By the end
of REPELITA IV (1988), the PDAM and BPAM's services were targeted to cover 75%
of the 45 million urban population. Despite the set target and all the investments that
have been executed, the number of people who do not have adequate safe water in
2 Three major actions taken by the government were: (1) promoting exports from
sectors other than oil and gas, (2) tax reform, and (3) promoting private participation in
public-sector activities.
3 When the new-order regime took over the government from the previous regime,
it started to establish a long-term economic plan called Long-Term Development Plan I
(Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang I), which consists of five REPELITAs. The
first REPELITA was started in 1969.
urban areas increased from 18 million in 1980 to 27 million in 1990, representing 55%
of the total urban population (Sidabutar, 1992).
Private-Sector Participation as a National Policy
Given the problem of the government's inability to provide adequate
infrastructure services, especially in urban areas, the Chairman of the National
Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, or
BAPPENAS) issued the National Urban Policy Statement in 1987, whose policy
objective was to decentralize the provision of urban infrastructure services.4 In
summary, it states that the local governments will be responsible for (a) planning and
programming of their urban infrastructure services; (b) mobilizing financial resources to
finance their urban-development programs; (c) strengthening their institutional capacities
in order to implement their urban-development programs, with assistance from the
central and provincial governments. Currently, the National Urban Policy Statement is
implemented through the nation-wide, urban-development program called the Integrated
Urban Infrastructure Development Program (IUIDP). An important aspect of this
program is to promote the private-sector participation in urban infrastructure
development.
The importance of private-sector participation is clearly stated in the REPELITA
V as well. Of the total investment funds needed during the fiscal year 1988/89-
1992/93, 55% were expected to come from the private sector. For provincial
4 Chairman of BAPPENAS Decree No. 016/Kep/4/1987, about the Coordination
Team for Urban Development.
governments, this is an opportunity to invite the private sector to augment their
provincial economic-development programs, including the infrastructure services. In the
following section and the rest of the thesis, I will be focusing on the Indonesian
experience in promoting private-sector participation in the water-supply services.
History of the Water-Supply Industry in Indonesia
Prior to 1988, the MPW and the Ministry of Health (MOH) were responsible for
drinking-water services, at the central government level. The fund for this service is
allocated by BAPPENAS through project development grants (Daftar Isian Proyek, or
DIP) and the Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden, or INPRES) fund for health
services.' The DIP is administered by the MPW, while the INPRES is managed by the
MOH. The geographical allocation of these funds is also different. MPW's DIP is
used to finance drinking-water services in urban areas, while the INPRES is for rural
areas. The lack of technical expertise within the MOH caused program failures, and
since 1985, the MPW has provided the capital investment and technical supervision for
INPRES as well, while the MOH retains its role in water-quality control.
' DIP and INPRES funds are both central government expenditures. The
difference is that INPRES funds are treated as revenue sources for the provincial and
local governments. These funds, which are specific grants, are intended to provide
incentives for the provincial and local governments. There are 8 kinds of INPRES
funds for various purposes : health services, local markets, provincial government
development programs (INPRES Daerah Tingkat I, or INPRES DATI I), local
government development programs (INPRES Daerah Tingkat II, or INPRES DATI II),
provincial roads, district roads, and reforestation. For the purpose of this thesis, the
health services grant will be referred to as INPRES.
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Starting in 1988, the agency division between urban and rural areas was
abandoned. From that time on, the institutional approach has been to integrate the
execution of water and sanitation projects in rural and urban areas under ministries
responsible for specific action. Under this approach, the MOH is responsible for
community participation and water-quality control; the Ministry of Home Affairs
(MHA) for institutional development; and the MPW for capital investment and technical
assistance (World Bank, 1991).
The institutional arrangements of water-supply services in urban areas take a
different form. Initially, the MPW creates a drinking-water management board, called
BPAM. BPAM generally starts its service by providing a piped-water system and
standpipes. Within five years, the BPAM is supposed to meet certain performance
criteria, so that it can be transferred to the city government for operation as a water
enterprise. By the time the BPAM is transferred to the local government, the legal
status of the BPAM is changed from a central government's unit to a local government
water enterprise called Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum (PDAM). This is the normal
institutional arrangement used by the government to provide drinking-water services. In
a special case, such as in the province of East Java where the provincial government
has to have a representative in public-private partnership, the provincial government
may create a provincial water enterprise (Perusahaan Daerah Air Bersih, or PDAB).
The PDAB was established as a realization of the central government's private-sector
participation policy in the provision of urban infrastructure services.
Reasons for Privatizing the Water-Supply Industry
The government's two main reasons for promoting private involvement in public
services, especially the water-supply, are:
1. To tap private financial resources, because it is difficult for the government to
finance all development projects required to sustain the current economic
growth. This policy relieves the government's financial burden, and the
government development funds can be allocated for other purposes.
2. To attain operating efficiency, because one of the IUIDP's goals is to promote
private-sector involvement in urban development. The private sector is expected
to bring innovative management which will bring greater productive efficiency
than is currently realized with public provision.
Thiemeyer categorized fifteen different kinds of privatization experienced in
many different countries (Ramanadham, 1989: Appendix 1). In this analysis, I will
limit the discussion to full privatization, in terms of full private funding, and public-
private partnership, because these are the most popular forms adopted by the water-
supply industry.6 In some cases, as experienced in the British water-supply industry,
full privatization--in terms of selling off public assets--is adopted. Suselo and Taylor
(1992) argue that selling off local water enterprises in Indonesia, is very unlikely to be
realized at the moment, because of two reasons: (a) it may create a conflict with
6 The full privatization form has been adapted to small-scale water-supply systems
for industrial purposes, such as in the cities of Tembagapura, Bontang and Soroako,
where the mining companies developed the water-treatment plant and its distribution
network, and in a new privately built town of Bumi Serpong Damai.
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existing legislation, which places responsibility for public water-supply with the
government; and (b) it involves socially sensitive issues and would have to include very
carefully considered safeguards for the urban poor.
The first reason is closely related to the government regulation that, if the assets
are valuable, prohibits the government from selling its assets to achieve public-welfare
objectives, while the second one is related to the nature of the industry. In many cases
the water-supply industry has a characteristic of a natural monopoly. If full
privatization were to be awarded to a private firm, the government is afraid that the
private firm would charge a monopoly price. A water-supply system may not
necessarily be a monopoly industry, if one area can be supplied by different water
resources, but if water is distributed by a piped system from a single source, the
economies of scale are so great that it becomes a natural monopoly (Roth, 1987: 236).
Full privatization of the water-supply system, in particular, and utilities industries, in
general, is very attractive to the private sector, because if they gain the exclusive right
to operate the business in the designated area, there is an opportunity to earn a high
return. Conversely, the private sector is often unwilling to make the very high fixed-
cost investment necessary for water distribution network. Public-private partnerships
seem to be the most acceptable option to encourage private-sector involvement for the
time being, because the public sector has the expertise required to operate the water-
supply system in Indonesia, while the private-sector has the advantage in mobilizing
their financial resources.
Issues of Water-Supply Privatization in Indonesia
Public-private partnership in the water-supply industry in Indonesia, has been
promoted recently. However, some difficulties in promoting the private-sector
participation have occurred. One important reason is the lack of regulations in the
industry. Hanke and Walters (1987) suggested that a strict regulation regarding the
privatization of the water utilities is needed so that there is a balance between
performing the social function, which is to provide public goods/services to all people at
an affordable price, and being able to earn a profit. Privatization of the industry may
create a serious exploitation of the market, and the social function of public utilities
may be sacrificed if there are no clear guidelines to operate the businesses.
In Indonesia, the rules and regulations of the water-supply industry are
inadequate, and are limited to public enterprises. There even remain serious problems
with the regulation of PDAM and BPAM. The lack of regulations' enforcement is a
major problem with privatization. Too much political intervention in the process
benefits the private-sector interests at the expense of the public sector and the
consumers. It takes a strong institution and influential officials to make certain that the
regulations are properly enforced; however, privatization of water-supply services in
Indonesia cannot be avoided. It will be promoted further because of the government's
urban development policy. In order to the execute this policy, we need to answer three
questions : (1) How do we privatize the water utility?; (2) What regulations do we need
in order to ensure that the objectives of privatization can be achieved?; and (3) How
should we arrange the regulatory institutions to make the regulations effective?
To answer these questions, I will evaluate the existing regulatory framework for
privatizing the water-supply industry, to examine an on-going case of the Umbulan
Spring Water Project, and to discuss the role of the institutions involved in the
privatization process. The Umbulan Project is the first case of water-supply
privatization in Indonesia, so that it is very important to learn a lesson from the
project's experience.
This public-private partnership project will eventually use spring water in
Umbulan, a village located about 80 kilometers south of Surabaya, which is the capital
of East Java and one of Indonesia's largest cities. The spring will be able to provide a
water-treatment plant of up to 5.2 cubic meters per second (m3/sec.), and the project
will serve the water needs in Sidoarjo, Gresik, Pasuruan, and Surabaya. The project
will not distribute the treated water directly to customers but to water enterprises in
those four cities through the PDAB. The distribution to the final users has to be done
by the PDAMs because of the large-scale economies. Currently, the PDAMs in
Sidoarjo, Pasuruan, and Gresik are constructing an expanded distribution scheme under
the World Bank sponsored East Java and Bali Urban Development Project, while for
Surabaya, another expanded scheme and rehabilitation of the existing network are being
proposed to the World Bank under the Surabaya Urban Development Project I.
As I described earlier, the government's development budget was reduced by
12% in 1986, and the Umbulan Project was the first project in the water-supply industry
to be affected by the reduction. At the same time, however, the demand for additional
water services in Sidoarjo, Gresik, Pasuruan, and, especially, Surabaya is so high that
the provision of water could no longer be postponed. The preparation of the Umbulan
Project was started in 1988 after the MPW had decided to invite private investors to be
involved in the provision of water-supply services. Project negotiations have been
conducted since then, and they have become a lengthy process with no clear indication
of when the project will be implemented. The uncertainties of the project are related to
the goals of the public and private sectors. On the one hand, the provincial government
is concerned with maintaining the social function of the water utility, namely, providing
the goods at an affordable price, but, on the other hand, the private sector is concerned
with maximizing its profit and earning a relatively quick return. In addition, there is an
indication that the private sector will exploit the unregulated market of the water-supply
industry.
Given the fact that there is no reference to existing regulations during project
preparation, I will show that there is an inadequate regulatory framework for negotiating
and providing water-supply services and a lack of regulation enforcement in the
industry. Experience in some countries suggests that before privatization is undertaken
for public utilities, a regulatory framework and institutions must be developed in
advance. The absence of such a framework in Indonesia suggests that the benefits of
privatization are unlikely to be realized and that clearly specified contracts defining
output and other criteria are very unlikely to be developed. Also, even if such contracts
did exist, the government's monitoring capacity might be inadequate. Finally, the
absence of competitive bidding will not guarantee that private production will be more
efficient, and it tends to discourage the realization of public welfare goals.
Thesis Outline
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the conditions necessary to privatize
drinking-water provision in Indonesia in a way that meets public goals. In Chapter 1, I
have explained the history of the water-supply industry in Indonesia and the reasons to
promote the private-sector in this industry and have given a brief overview of the
Umbulan Spring Water Project and some issues of concern that arise from it. In
Chapter 2, I will provide a comparative analysis of privatization of water provision in
industrial and developing countries, focusing on public-private partnerships and full
privatization, rules and regulations, and the institutional arrangements. I will argue that
a regulatory framework is needed before privatization of water-supply services can be
undertaken. In Chapter 3, I will conduct a case study of the Umbulan Project in
Indonesia, providing some arguments of the project's arrangement that may preclude the
intended goals of privatization. In Chapter 4, the final chapter, I will provide some
lessons from the Indonesian case for privatization of the water-supply industry in
Indonesia and other countries. I will also include suggestions regarding appropriate
options for private-sector participation in Indonesia.
CHAPTER 2
COMPETITION AND REGULATION
The Indonesian Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945) declares that all
natural resources that are valuable for human welfare are to be controlled and regulated
by the government. It implies that the exploitation of water resources can be conducted
by anybody, but is controlled by the government. Some government officials and
politicians argue that natural resources should be strictly controlled and exploited by
government entities only, because of the existence of externalities and the characteristics
of public goods. They believe that private-sector monopoly for public-utility services
should be avoided, because the private sector has a profit-seeking motive and tends to
turn natural resources--as public goods--into private goods.
Natural resources should be exploited and managed in a way so that all people,
especially the poor, are able to consume them at an affordable price. Hanke (1984)
explains that this perspective arises because there is a confusion between providing and
financing public goods. He further suggests that to sort out the solutions to the alleged
problems of externalities and public goods, policy makers must realize that goods can
be supplied by either public or private enterprises, and that this supply can be financed
by either public-user fees and taxes or private charges (Hanke, 1984: 15). By
combining these alternatives, the problems of productive efficiency and public-welfare
objectives can be attained. The question is how do we achieve these objectives,
especially in a water-supply industry characterized by a natural monopoly market?
To answer this question, I will evaluate the experience of water-supply
privatization in the United States, England, France, and Cote d'Ivoire, which have
implemented their privatization program for the water utilities. My analysis will be
focused on some issues that those countries have experienced, which include: (a) the
necessary competitive environment to be created in a privatization program; (b) forms
of privatization in a water-supply industry; (c) the regulations needed for water-supply
privatization; and (d) the institutional arrangements.
Need for Competition
In the utility industries, a monopoly market takes on a more distinct form than
under perfect competition. Veljanovski explains that the prospect of direct competition
between firms in the basic utility industries, such as gas, water, electricity, and parts of
the telecommunications industry, is limited by the technology of transmission networks.
All these industries have a monopoly element, which will not be completely taken away
even in the most permissive market system, nor would new entry be profitable other
than in the short term. This is because the transmission networks of the gas, electricity,
water, and, to a much lesser extent, the telecommunications industries are "natural"
monopolies (Veljanovski, 1989).
Furthermore, he mentions that a natural monopoly was defined by economists as
an industry where economies of scale existed throughout the range of the demand that
was forthcoming at different prices. Recent economic researchers have redefined the
concept as a situation where it is cheaper for one firm to supply the market than for two
or more firms to produce the same quantity of goods (Veljanovski, 1989: 37).
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Finding that utility industries are natural monopolies, analysts indicate that
competition is difficult to create within the market. There are three ways in which
competition may be introduced in this market:
1. Contestability. Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) argue that in a contestable
market, both entry and exit must occur in a free and frictionless manner. A firm
may choose to enter a market and compete at whichever price it wishes. If it
leaves the market, it can recover the full value of its assets and sell the assets or
take them to another market, so that there are no sunk costs associated with its
entry into a market. If a number of firms with identical technologies are
contemplating entry into a market that is a natural monopoly, the absence of
sunk costs will lead to normal returns on investment (Nowotny, Smith, and
Trebing, 1989). This situation may occur because these firms produce the output
without considerable investment costs. Their output, in this particular monopoly
market, is an outcome of their relatively large-scale operations.
2. Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition. Here, Chamberlin (1962) gives an
example of his concept in the transportation industry. Strong intermodal
competition among air carriers, railroads, pipelines, and water carriers, which
compete for freight traffic, has been cited as a basis for deregulation of freight
transportation, even if one or more of the transportation modes appear to have a
natural-monopoly structure (Nowotny, Smith, and Trebing, 1989). Such
competition works as a result of the government's deregulation policy. The
experience of the American airline industry shows that, following the airline
deregulation, there were increased productivity, reduced wages of airline
employees, widened consumers' choices, and lower air fares. The industry,
however, is characterized by a high sensitivity of profit to demand, because of
the high fixed costs of operating a fleet of aircraft and uncertainties in demand
and operational costs. The competition has led to merger activity and has
caused an increase in concentration, with the six largest airlines increasing their
market share from 73% in 1978 to 84% in 1986. An oligopoly has started to be
established, and airfares have started to increase (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).
3. Demsetz Competition. Demsetz (1968) noted that competition may be
introduced even in a natural monopoly market, just by establishing a franchise
and then requiring competition for the right to serve the franchise.' By doing
this, he argued, that a public enterprise and its accompanying inefficiency could
be avoided, as well as the wastes and inefficiency of a natural monopoly.
Instead, the benefits of free, unregulated, and competitive private enterprise
could be obtained (Hanke, 1984: 17). Hanke explains further, that to obtain the
desired result of free competition and cost-effectiveness of private supply,
Demsetz's system requires that the franchise be awarded to the producer who
will provide the lowest output price. This price needs to be specified explicitly
in the contract. In other words, the public authority that established the
franchise would not receive payment from a successful franchise. Rather, the
Demsetz presupposes that public enterprises are inefficient, or, at least, more
inefficient that private enterprises.
public authority would act as a bargaining agent for customers in the franchise
area. The public authority would have, as its objective, to award the franchise to
the private firm that would supply a given quality and quantity of service over
the franchise's life at the lowest price. The firm that won the bidding for the
franchise would then have a contract with the franchisor, who represented the
consumers in the franchise area. The natural monopoly problem would therefore
be solved without recourse to a public enterprise (Hanke, 1984: 17-18).
Demsetz competition works well in a situation where the following requirements
occur: (a) the quality and the price of output are clearly specified; (b) the technology to
produce the output is relatively simple; (c) the future development of the demand for
water and its production costs are fairly predictable; (d) no particular informational
advantages of the incumbent or some particular bidders are expected; and (e) the cost of
collusion among bidding rivals must be prohibitively high, so that competitive bidding
is, in fact, the outcome of the bidding process (Hanke, 1984; Nowotny, Smith, and
Trebing, 1989; and Bos, 1991).
The experience in the United States, England, France and COte d'Ivoire suggests
that it is important to create competition before a privatization program is implemented,
no matter what form of privatization is adopted by the government. The experience in
the United States and England represents how full privatization is conducted under a
regulatory framework, which makes their model a possible alternative for the Indonesian
water-utility industry in the future. Those in France and COte d'Ivoire are similar to a
program being negotiated in Indonesia.
Need for Regulations
In the above discussion, I explained why we need competition and that the
competition can be introduced into a market characterized by natural monopoly. With
competition, the concept of providing public services by the public enterprise is
somewhat reoriented not toward competition under private ownership, but toward
private monopoly operation under public regulation (Pryke, 1982).
Donahue (1989) argues that because utilities are local monopolies, the
monopolies tend to charge too much and produce too little, if the industries are not
regulated. Regulation is needed to ensure competition in a natural monopoly market. 2
Competition may lead to productive efficiency, i.e., the efficiency of a market in
producing current products at the lowest cost in the long term, using existing technology
(Pass, Lowes, Davies, and Kronish, 1991). When productive efficiency is supposed to
be accomplished in a natural monopoly market, however, it is likely that efficiency in
the allocation of resources will not be achieved because of the incentives to raise and
maintain prices above costs. The experience in England shows that regulation has been
proposed as a means of securing the optimal allocation of resources and pricing policy
(Domberger, 1985). Regulations should, therefore, be seen not as a substitute for
competition, but as a supplement to competition (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).
2 Kaysen and Turner noted that regulations should be introduced when: (1)
competition cannot exist or survive for long, and, therefore, an unregulated market will
not produce competitive results; (2) active competition exists but does not produce
competitive results because of market imperfections; and/or (3) competition exists and
has produced competitive results, but is unsatisfactory because of policy interventions
(Phillips, 1988: 44).
Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley (1992) mention that regulations must be formulated
clearly to cover the potential legal issues before privatization is implemented, during
implementation, and after privatization is completed. At the pre-privatization period,
regulations may be passed to deregulate certain sectors, e.g. the trade and transportation,
so that the flow of goods and capital, which was previously restricted and took a longer
time to deliver, is easier; abolish monopolies in order to promote private-sector
involvement; strengthen capital and financial markets so that public and private firms
are able to invest more in public services; and authorize public enterprises to prepare
the privatization process themselves, especially in the transfer of assets ownership.
During implementation, all parties should have clear guidance in negotiating all
aspects of the project and help in establishing the agreements, i.e., risk-sharing, solving
disputes, standard performance, and pricing of the output. It is very important that
these aspects are specified before the privatization is implemented, because, in such a
program, the ultimate goal is to provide "public" goods and services to all consumers at
a price that reflects the social cost and benefits. Unclear specification of these aspects
may create a lengthy negotiation process, unfair contractual arrangements, and excessive
profits, which tend to sacrifice the attainment of public-welfare objectives.
Finally, after a privatization project is completed, there should be clear
specifications, so that all parties comply with the terms of the privatization agreements.
The regulatory framework may need to be fine-tuned to ensure that it is allowing
private enterprise to develop while protecting the legitimate interests of consumers and
competitors (Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 1992: 41).
It is very clear that a regulatory framework in the privatization of public utilities,
including water supply, is a basic requirement. An examination of the regulatory
institutions necessary to privatize the water-utility industry in the United States,
England, France, and Cote d'Ivoire will be presented in the following section.
Regulatory Institutions
The United States and France provide examples of a water-supply industry
regulated by local governments. In the United States, being one of the most
decentralized governmental systems in the world, the water-supply industry is not a
federal government service. Until 1976, 46% of 34,631 water systems were owned by
the private sector. The industry, however, is regulated by different institutions at the
federal, state, and local levels. Some private water systems are controlled by state
commissions, while most of the public systems are regulated at the local level, i.e., by
city councils, water commissions, etc. (Phillips, 1989).
In France, the government denationalized its water-supply industry by
introducing privatization into the industry more than a hundred years ago. In 1882, the
government awarded the first franchise contract for water-distribution rights in Paris to
the Perrier brothers for a 15-year period. Today, about 55 percent of France's drinking
water is supplied by private companies, which mostly takes the form of concessions
(Veljanovski, 1989: 49; Roth, 1987).'
3 Veljanovski (1989) defines a concession as an arrangement where the private
company constructs the facilities with its own capital and maintains and operates the
system.
In the United States, daily operations of the water systems have to follow state
and local regulations. The same legal mechanism occurs in France. In 1981, when the
socialist party came to power, the government introduced a nationalization program,
which affected all utilities industries, except the water utility. In fact, it was the
mayors, regardless of their political party affiliation, who argued that nationalizing the
industry would sacrifice the cost-efficiency the industry had achieved (Hanke 1984: 20).
In the United States, there is no special institution established for the water-
supply industry. The federal government, however, has established some regulatory
institutions related to all utility industries. They are: (1) the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, to regulate the construction and licensing of nuclear power facilities; (2)
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, to regulate power projects on navigable
rivers, the transmission and sale of electric energy and, natural gas in interstate
commerce; (3) the Federal Communications Commission, to regulate radio and
television broadcasting, and interstate and foreign telephone and telegraph services; and
(4) the Securities Exchange Commission, to regulate the conditions of sale of new
securities, and some practices of the stock exchanges; later on, the commission was
given power to regulate the finances and corporate structures of electric and gas utility
holding companies (Phillips, 1989: 133-134).
New organizations outside the traditional regulatory commissions were created at
all levels of governments to deal with many of the public concerns or to represent
consumers. At the federal level, they are the National Regulatory Research Institute,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Mine Safety and Health
Administration, and the Department of Energy. At the state level, they include air and
water-control or pollution boards, consumer protection agencies, and energy departments
(Phillips, 1989: 18).
The institutional arrangements of the water-privatization experience in England
are somewhat different from those in the United States and France. Prior to 1973, the
water-supply industry in England and Wales was dominated by three categories of
organization: (1) water authorities,4 (2) sewerage and sewage disposal authorities, and
(3) river authorities. Through a consolidation process, the number of water authorities
was reduced from more than 1000 to only 198, of which 64 were run by individual
local government authorities, 101 by joint boards comprising more than one local
government authority, and 33 by statutory privately-owned water companies.
In 1973, the British government reorganized the water-supply industries by
forming ten water authorities according to each administrative boundary. The principal
aim was to achieve economies of scale and scope associated with larger and more
integrated operations. Each authority was entrusted with responsibility for water supply,
sewerage, sewage disposal, water-resource planning, pollution control, fisheries, flood
protection, water recreation, and environmental conservation in its own area. The
reorganization implied that these authorities have environmental and regulatory
4 These organizations were responsible for the supply and distribution of water.
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responsibilities.' Through the Water Act of 1983, the authorities were nationalized;
therefore, the control over the authorities was shifted in 1983 to the central government
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: 389-392).6
In England, the British government's privatization program (1986 White Paper)
reorganized the institutional and regulatory frameworks of the water-supply industry.
The program goals are outlined as follows:
1. Restructure the ten water authorities into ten water-supply public limited
companies (WSPLCs). Later on these WSPLCs will be offered for sale in the
stock market.
2. Establish a system of regulating the WSPLCs.
3. Modernize the water and sewerage law.
4. Permit domestic water-metering trials on a compulsory basis.
5. Improve the legislative framework for the control of drinking water and river
quality; furthermore, the industry will be regulated by a new Director General of
Water Services, and some regulatory functions relating to the environmental
matters will be retained by the WSPLCs (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: 399).
5 Later, this right of regulatory function was abandoned and shifted to the National
Rivers Authority.
6 In the meantime, the privately owned water companies were not touched by the
government policies, but were subject to strict regulatory controls, which include
restrictions on the amounts of share and loan capital that can be raised, the methods by
which new share capital can be raised, rates of dividend on share capital, rates of
interest on loan capital, amounts that may be put into reserve and contingency funds,
and amounts of accumulated surpluses that may be carried forward from one year to the
next.
The role of the central government is also important in the case of C6te d'Ivoire.
Privatization of water-supply services in the COte d'Ivoire has been strictly controlled
by the central government. In 1960, the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) awarded the
C6te d'Ivoire Water Distribution Company (Socidt6 de Distribution d'Eau de la COte
d'Ivoire, or SODECI)--a subsidiary of a French water-supply company (Socidt6
d'Amdnagement Urbain et Rural, or SAUR)--a monopoly right to operate and maintain
the water-supply system in Abidjan for 30 years through a combination of affremage
and concession contracts through a competitive bidding.! The government's control
over the private sector is conducted by a unit in the MPW, which is also responsible for
the planning and building of all large new investments in water-supply. This
institutional separation of investments from operations makes it easier to evaluate
SODECI's performance and ensures government control over the expansion of the
system (Roth, 1987; Veljanovski, 1989).
Having discussed the institutional arrangements in these four countries, I now
explain the role regulation plays in each country. In the following section, I will
discuss the regulations necessary for water-supply privatization. The regulations are
closely related to the form of privatization the government in each country has adopted.
7 A franchise is a contractual arrangement entered into for a specified period of
time, with the franchisee paying a royalty to the franchisor for the rights assigned in
addition to other possible considerations. Two types of a franchise arrangement are
concession and affremage. See footnote number 3 for the definition of concession.
Affremage is defined as an arrangement where the government is responsible for
providing the capital investment of the water-supply system, and the private company is
accountable for the management and maintenance of the system. In concessions, a
contractual formula fixes the price at which water can be sold (Veljanovski, 1989).
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Regulatory Framework
The need to protect consumers so that they are able and willing to pay for the
utilities services was rather difficult to achieve prior to the 1930s in the United States.
In fact the utilities enjoyed an enormous profit. The situation was partly due to the
infancy of the accounting profession and of private utilities. Consistent with the
establishment of regulatory institutions, the federal government has passed some
guidelines for the utilities industries. The guidelines are subject to: (a) environmental
standards (Safe Drinking Water Act); (b) accounting procedure standards and a uniform
systems of accounts; (c) a standard rate of return; and (d) service, safety and
management efficiency standards, as well as a standard formulation of the utility-rate
base and its structure.
The state and local governments used the federal government's guidelines to
pass more detailed regulations for technical, environmental, and financial aspects. To
ensure that the regulations are not misinterpreted but are widely enforced, the federal
government has deconcentrated its regulatory institutions, such as the Environmental
Protection Agency, the General Accounting Office, the Security Exchange Commission,
etc. Special regulations for privatizing the water-utility industry have been passed by
the state and local governments in the United States and France and by the central
government in COte d'Ivoire and England. A comparative analysis of some key issues
of the necessary regulatory framework will be presented in the following sections.
Statutory and Regulatory Authorities
One example of the regulation established for a privatization program in the
United States, comes from the water and waste-water project in Salt Lake City. The
local or state authorities were commissioned to issue bonds to finance the water
projects; to convey existing water and waste-water treatment facilities to private parties;
to authorize local authorities to enter into long-term contracts for water and waste-water
services; and to authorize local authorities to assess user charges and the term of service
between a public authority and a private owner of a facility (Goldman and Mokuvos,
1984).
In France, the local governments have the authority to open periodically the
market to potential rivals of the current franchisee, so that the competitive environment
of the French water-supply industry can be maintained. The local governments can also
settle contractual arrangements. Franchises, in France, can last for as long as 30 years,
when capital infrastructure is both owned and operated by the franchisee. In situations
where private firms have operating concessions to operate and maintain capital that is
owned by a public entity, the contract's length is 12 years at maximum. Due to this
time scale, significant changes in demand, costs, and technologies may occur over the
life of the franchise. The local governments, therefore, always require the franchisee to
state clearly the pricing formula, which is usually complex, and to put clauses in the
contract to allow for a renegotiation option, should the pricing formula break down due
to unanticipated shocks (Hanke, 1984).
Financial Arrangements
In many privatization transactions in the United States, tax-exempt financing
from the private sector is used to finance most costs of construction. Usually this
agreement requires an unconditional opinion of a tax consultant because of the federal-
tax regulation that should be strictly followed. The financing agreement and trust
indenture will include the financial covenants and requirements imposed on the owner.
These will also be reflected in the service agreement, particularly as related to service
charge provisions and to capital or operation and maintenance conditions that affect
project economies (Goldman and Mokuvos, 1984).
In England, the regulation on capital financing of the water-utilities authorities is
set in a way that the authorities are directed to use internal funds rather than external
borrowings.8 This has been achieved by increasing operational efficiency and by
postponing new investment proposals; however, the policy leads to a very high price
increase because of the higher needs of cash flow (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: 398).
COte d'Ivoire has a different financing strategy. The government bears the costs
of constructing the water system and controls the price and investment policies, while
the SODECI manages and maintains the system. The financial arrangements between
SODECI and the government of Cote d'Ivoire has been clearly specified and fixed for a
certain period of time. SODECI is paid a fee related to the volume of water sold. The
fee is based on agreed standards for staff, equipment, energy, and other inputs, plus a
8 Between 1974 and 1987, the proportion of external borrowing of the industry
dropped from almost 100% to 10%.
margin based on agreed overheads and profits, which is indexed against inflation.
SODECI's fee is about one-third of the water tariff, which is set to cover not only
operation and maintenance costs, but also debt service (Roth, 1987). The performance
of the company proved to be so satisfactory that it has allowed the company to sell its
shares in the Ivorien capital market in 1978 in order to have more capital financing.
Nowadays, SAUR retains 46% of the share, the public owns 46%, the employees 5%,
and the state 3% (Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 1992; Veljanovski, 1989).
Service Contract and Pricing Formula
The contract usually outlines the terms of the privatization partnership and
includes any provisions, that protect the interests of both partners in the transaction.
The terms of the service contract are most likely to be a take-or-pay agreement, which
will provide the principal credit support for the project.' The agreement also covers
the length of contract period; termination of contracts; the pricing formula; terms of
payment; service-charge schedule--which usually includes a rate-escalation clause tied to
labor, power, and material indices and force majeure events; and the allocation of
liabilities and fines. In most cases, the private sector will be responsible for the
operational difficulties and the quality of the effluent. The service contract may also
include an engineering agreement, to allow the owner to provide or subcontract design
and engineering services for the project (Goldman and Mokuvos, 1984).
9 A take-or-pay agreement stipulates a minimum payment. As an example, in the
case of the Umbulan project, the minimum payment is stipulated for 260 million liters
of water per day. If, on one day, the PDAB can only buy 200 million liters, it would
still be required to make the minimum payment.
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The pricing formula of the French water-supply industry, is usually set up with a
ceiling on the price to be charged, while also allowing the franchisee to earn a
minimum level of profits; consequently, the formula works against the consumers
during a deflationary period and the other way around during an inflationary period. In
the latter case, the governments often subsidized the franchisee through tax exemptions.
An option to solve this problem is to make the franchise contestable in renegotiation, so
that the competitive price determination features of franchises will not be lost (Hanke,
1984).
An important lesson from the French water-supply privatization is associated
with the operational phase of the franchise's life. Analysts argue that by fixing the
incentives for the franchisee, the franchisee tends to underinvest in fixed assets and
reduce the maintenance quality. These problems have been solved by allowing the firm
to amortize its investments fully during the franchise and also requiring the firm to be
bonded with regard to the maintenance of plant and equipment. The latter requirement
reduces the monitoring required by the franchisor because the bonding firm will, in
effect, take over responsibility in this area and guarantee that the terms of the contract
are met. However, the franchisor still has to perform its monitoring responsibility in
order to perform its function as the customer's agent (Hanke, 1984: 21-23).
In the British water-supply industry, there is a rate-of-return regulation on the
maximum amount of profit (the ratio of net operating profit to net assets on current
account) the companies are able to earn, which ranged from 1.00% to 1.65% during
1984 through 1987. This has been argued to be a disincentive to the private sector to
participate in water-supply services, therefore discouraging competition in the industry;
furthermore, there is a tendency to underinvest, which will endanger the future service
quality (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, and Stelzer, 1989).
In the United States, the rate-of-return standard varies just as utilities'
regulations differ from place to place. Phillips (1988) mentions that, although there
were a lot of disputes about the rate-of-return in the past, the Supreme Court has
formulated no specific rules for determining a fair rate-of-return, but instead enumerated
general guidelines. These guidelines state that the rate-of-return allowed to a public
utility should be high enough to: (1) maintain the financial principle of the enterprise;
(2) enable the utility to attract the new capital it needs to serve the public; and (3)
provide a return on common equity that is commensurate with the return on investments
in other enterprises of corresponding risk.
Phillips further explains that the Supreme Court provides a detailed interpretation
of the pricing guidelines to each regulatory commission. Each commission then
establishes its own pricing formula, which, in general, incorporates three important
aspects: (1) revenue requirements, which are based on a utility basis (operating
expenses, depreciation, taxes, and return on rate) or on a cash basis (operating and
maintenance expense, debt service, payment-in-lieu-of-taxes, and plant extensions,
replacements, and improvements); (2) cost-of-service, which can be classified as base
costs (costs associated with service to customers under average load conditions), extra
capacity costs (costs associated with use requirements in excess of the average),
customer costs (meter reading, billing, accounting and collection expenses), and direct
fire-protection costs (public fire hydrants, related branch mains, and valves); and (3)
cost allocation to specific customers, which can be based on distance, income groups
among households, and industries.
Risk-Sharing Arrangements
There is no specific theory of risk-sharing arrangements for a privatization
project. The experience of a public-private partnership in the United States suggests
that in order to manage risks, there has to be a cooperative spirit which allows the
partnership to thrive. Goldman and Mokuvos (1984) recommend that both parties must
take time to work together to identify the risks involved in financing, constructing, and
operating the desired project. Both parties must ensure that an acceptable risk-
management approach is developed and implemented. Goldman and Mokuvos,
nonetheless, provide the following important guidelines for risk-sharing arrangements:
1. Construction risks, such as cost overruns, contract suspensions, unforeseen site
problems, force majeure delays caused by "acts of God" (fires, floods, and
earthquake), and inadequate insurance, should be directly faced by the
community, who is the project owner.
2. Both parties' involvement in the project preparation should be adequate, so that
any detailed changes, problems, potential benefits can be justified and accepted
by all parties.
3. Communities should require performance guarantees from the private operator,
which include monetary penalties for noncompliance and contract termination
clauses for extended nonperformance.
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4. The private-sector firm should bear the operating risks, because the investors
will be concerned about plant performance and will hold the operator
accountable for its performance. To some extent, the private firm's risks of
increased operating costs can be reduced by including cost-escalation clauses in
the contract for the operation of the facility.
5. The community must be certain that the private firm is making the investments
in repair and rehabilitation necessary to keep the plant operating properly, even
after the service contract expires.
6. The financial risks associated with a privatization transaction are risks that every
private firm takes when it makes a capital-intensive investment and/or undertakes
a new business venture.
Conclusion
The experience of the privatization of the water-supply industry in the United
States, England, France and COte d'Ivoire indicates that privatization is a process that
needs a lot of careful effort and takes a long time to prepare. The first desirable step to
introduce a private-sector involvement into a natural monopoly market of the utilities
industries is competition, which can be encouraged through regulations. My review of
the regulatory framework and regulatory institution in other countries leads me to
conclude that a clear understanding of privatization and detailed regulations for
privatization of utilities industries are very important in securing productive efficiency
and quality of product, as well as to reflect the social costs and benefits of public
goods. These objectives mean that through privatization, it is expected that a
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community will be able to purchase a widely available and privately produced public
good or service at a price that reflects the community's ability and willingness to pay
and that offers a fair return to the private producer, so that it can continue to produce
the good or service in the future. The legal structure, statutory authority, and adequate
financial regulations indicated by the privatization experience of water-supply industries
in these countries, especially in the United States, have proven to be sufficient to attain
the privatization and public-welfare objectives.
In addition to the regulatory and institutional frameworks, the experiences in
these countries indicate that the government, by controlling the privatization program,
has successfully achieved these objectives. The governments' control over the
contractual arrangements--as indicated in the case of France and COte d'Ivoire--has
assured that society is able to pay for the water at a fair price, while still generating a
fair return to the private-sector franchisee. These are the conditions that should be met
to make a privatization program effective.
Indonesia has started to introduce private-sector involvement into its utilities
industries, including water supply. The Umbulan Spring Water Project was the first
pilot project in the privatization of the water-supply industry. As I explained earlier, the
Umbulan project preparation has been going on since 1988, but, so far, it has not been
implemented. In the next chapter, I will analyze how the project has been prepared and
how the privatization goals and public-welfare objectives are expected to be achieved.
CHAPTER 3
THE UMBULAN PROJECT
As I briefly described in the previous chapter, negotiations of the Umbulan
Project have been taking place for almost four years. For both the public sector and the
private sector, the financial issues are the most difficult subjects upon which to agree.
The unusual institutional arrangement of the project, inadequate regulatory framework,
and lack of regulation enforcement seem to cause lengthy negotiations.
In the case of the Umbulan Project, the institutional arrangements are unusual, in
that the government's representative, the East Java water enterprise (Perusahaan Daerah
Air Bersih, or PDAB)', is not only acting as the main shareholder of the public-private
partnership, but also the sole buyer of the project's output. This is an ambiguous
arrangement because the two positions have different objectives. The first one has an
objective to maximize profit, while the second has an objective to purchase a high-
quality of output, which is continuously available at the lowest price.
In Indonesia, there are inadequate legal guidelines for the government to use
when negotiating its privatization program with private investors. The inadequate
regulatory framework permits the private sector to provide many alternative financial
analyses of the project, all with the goal of maximizing profit. The government,
however, is concerned with ensuring that affordable and fair prices are charged to the
water consumers. Yet, without clear regulations, the government has had difficulties
1 A provincial water entity especially established to represent the provincial
government of East Java in the Umbulan Project.
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fostering the kind of competition that would force companies to keep prices down.
Competition and an adequate regulatory framework are believed by analysts to be an
effective means to promote efficiency in public-service provision. Nevertheless, the
government is having difficulties in achieving the objective, because there are no
guidelines for directing its private counterpart in the project preparation.
The unfavorable conditions mentioned above are worsened by a deficiency in
implementing the existing regulations. From my research, I have come to believe that
too much political intervention in the government decision-making threatens to
compromise the regulations. Often private firms with the right "connection" are allowed
to work around the regulation. These conditions discourage a competitive environment
in the provision of water-services to Surabaya and its surrounding cities. These issues
leave the viability of the project in doubt, because there will be little incentive for firms
to attain productive efficiency. Later in this chapter, I will show why this efficiency
and the public-welfare objective cannot be achieved, under the present circumstances.
Before arguing that competition is going to be a difficult condition to achieve, I will
present a brief description of the water-supply industry in Indonesia and the preparation
of the project.
Origin of the Umbulan Project
Surabaya is the second largest city in Indonesia. As the capital city of the East
Java province, it is the center of governmental and business activities for the region. Its
strategic location in the Indonesian archipelago has made Surabaya an important transit
city for the trade routes between the western and eastern parts of Indonesia. Yet of the
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2.3 million population of Surabaya, 1 million inhabitants do not have access to clean
water services. The existing services of the local water enterprise (PDAM Surabaya)
cannot cover the demand for water in the city. Further, some of the surrounding cities,
like Pasuruan, Gresik, and Sidoarjo are facing the same problem as Surabaya is having
now.2
The lack of water services in Surabaya has been recognized for a long time. A
1976 inventory of water resources for East Java showed that there are many water
resources available for Surabaya. Given financial, environmental, and technical criteria
for water-resources development, the study indicates that the priorities for developing
water-resources for Surabaya should be: (1) Karangkates dam, (2) Umbulan spring, and
(3) Wonorejo dam.3
Competitive Bidding in the Project Preparation
After the Umbulan spring was identified in 1976, the MPW, through the
Directorate of Program Development (Bina Program-Cipta Karya, or BPCK), started to
prepare the development of the Umbulan Project.4 In 1986, with financial assistance
2 Pasuruan, Gresik, and Sidoarjo already have water enterprises. More than 80%
of the PDAM Surabaya's customers are households, while the other PDAM's customers
are mostly industries.
3 Later on, the 1988 East Java Water Resources Study not only supported the 1976
study, but also suggested that the spring water flow is high enough to provide the water
needs in Pasuruan, Gresik, and Sidoarjo as well (Project Memorandum of PDAM
Surabaya Consultant Team to PDAB of East Java, 1 August 1991).
4 BPCK was directly responsible for planning and programming the urban
infrastructure development in the MPW.
from the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), BPCK completed the
detailed engineering design and estimated project costs for the Umbulan water-treatment
plant.' The project was scheduled to be executed in 1986 through the MPW's DIP, but
was later postponed because of the financial difficulties the government had. In the
meantime, the water scarcity in Surabaya was still unsolved, and, consistent with the
Chairman of BAPPENAS's National Urban Policy Statement, the MPW urged the
Governor of East Java to invite the private sector to help finance the Umbulan project.
In August 1988, the investor were selected through project bidding, and P.T.
Bimantara Siti Wisesa won the bidding. The bidding process was supposed to be held
once, and the winner was be determined from it. Yet, even though Bimantara had
withdrawn as the project investor, upon request, it was granted a repeat bidding and was
reassigned as the winner.' One year later, Bimantara completely withdrew from the
project because: (a) there was no clear decision by the government to develop the
secondary water-distribution systems to the customers in the four cities, so that no
provider could be assured that the project would be able to operate at the agreed upon
full 4 m3/sec. capacity; and (b) the provincial government was unable to give a pledge
' Personal interview with Syafruddin A.T., staff of BPCK, and PDAB's file, "The
History of PDAB Activities", prepared for the Umbulan Project negotiation between the
Provincial Government of East Java and Bromo Consortium (July 1992). The project
includes the development of a water-intake scheme for 4 m3/sec., a pumping station, a
surge-control system, a 61 km main-transmission network, and the Wonocolo reservoir
(Lyonnaise, 1992).
6 When influential large companies can renegotiate bids, competition is often
discouraged among investors.
that the PDAB would be able to absorb the project's total production of 4 m3/sec.i In
April 1989, the Governor of East Java requested the approval from the Minister of
Home Affairs to decide that the second-ranked bidder, the Bromo Consortium, should
be appointed as the next investor of the Umbulan project. The Consortium's project
cost proposal was Rp. 165.4 billion.
When the government decided to invite a private investor to participate in the
Umbulan project, the provincial government of East Java and the MPW did not use the
opportunity to announce publicly their intention to bid the project, for example, by
informing the bidders of the expected price of water and quality of service, although the
detailed engineering design of the project had already been available, including the
estimated project costs and water price. A public notice was not given because the
government regulation for competitive bidding of public projects does not require
government agencies to make the bidding information publicly available.9 The
implication of this policy is that it does not create the necessary competitive
7 This information is given in a letter from Bimantara to the Governor of East
Java, dated 1 August 1989. The status of development of the secondary water-
distribution system from PDAB to the PDAM in those four cities was still unclear
(letter from the Minister of Public Works to the Governor of East Java, dated 3 March
1989). The OECF and the World Bank's intention to help finance this system were
announced a year later.
8 In his letter to the Governor of East Java, dated on 3 March 1989, the Minister
of Public Works indicated that the price of Umbulan water proposed by Bimantara was
close to the price they had expected before.
9 The author in his field work found the following three requirements: (1) there
must be at least three bidders in the process, (2) bidders should have experience in the
industry, and (3) bidders should be able to prove that they have sufficient funds to
finance the project.
environment in the industry. Potential investors might not have a clear reference to the
specified output expected by the government in terms of technical, financial, and
environmental aspects. They might even have a different understanding about the
project. For example, the operational and technical requirements between drinkable-
water and clean-water treatment plants are different because they require different
technical designs and a different estimated project cost.'0 It is almost impossible for a
true competitive environment to exist when there are a variety of standards, quality, and
classification in the different project proposals.
The appointment of the investor in the Umbulan project went through a
competitive-bidding process. Nevertheless, the bidding regulation was not appropriately
executed, because, when the Consortium withdrew from the project, following
Bimantara, the provincial government should have awarded the project to the third-
ranked bidder. Yet, the Consortium, just like Bimantara, requested the provincial
government and the MPW reappoint them as the investor.
From reviewing this experience, I conclude that, at the moment, competition
cannot adequately be promoted in the Indonesian water-supply industry. As mentioned
earlier, regulation can be used not only to promote regulation, but to protect the
consumers from market abuse. In the case of the Umbulan Project, the regulatory
'0 Personal communication with Nugroho Tri Utomo, a sanitation engineer from the
Socioeconomic and Spatial Planning Bureau, BAPPENAS, 18 April 1993. He also
explained that during the REPELITA I, the government's objective in water services
was to provide clean water services all over the country. The quality of water to be
provided at that time was lower than drinkable water quality--it has to be boiled before
one can drink it. In those years, the government could only afford to provide water-
system technology for lower-quality water (than that of drinkable water).
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framework is an important way to protect consumers from the private monopoly
company. Before discussing the regulations necessary for privatizing the water-supply
industry, I will evaluate the regulatory institutions of the industry.
Regulatory and Institutional Frameworks
In Chapter 1, I presented the history of the water-supply industry in Indonesia.
Since 1988, the industry has been jointly regulated by the MPW, MHA, and MOH.
These ministries are responsible for technical and capital investment, institutional
development, and quality control, respectively. The MHA has passed a regulation to
have standard operating practices for PDAM, including the formula for setting the price
of water. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued financial-management guidelines for
PDAM. The MOH has passed the standard water quality for PDAM for each different
area of services. The Indonesian government has passed two important laws, which
affect the operation of the water-supply industry: the 1983 Tax Law, and the 1990
Environmental Law. It also established the association of local water enterprises
(Persatuan Perusahaan Air Minum Seluruh Indonesia, or PERPAMSI) in 1982. The
MOF controls all business accounting and taxation practices, such as depreciation rate,
income tax, sales tax, account-reporting procedures, etc., which have been standardized
through the 1983 Tax Law. The central government established the Environmental
Impact Controlling Agency (Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan, or BAPEDAL),
which controls the standard pollution emission for all industries. In 1989, PERPAMSI
introduced a standard accounting procedure and management for PDAM.
From this institutional framework related to the water-supply industry, analysts
may conclude that there should be sufficient regulations to manage the water-utilities
industry; unfortunately, those regulations are specifically directed to control the
operation of PDAM and BPAM. The experience in the United States and England
shows that there has to be a regulatory framework for a privatization program,
regardless of the availability of the utilities regulations. In the following section, I will
evaluate the existing regulations for the industry and show how the regulatory
institutions deal with the Umbulan project. .
The Umbulan Project Under Inadequate Regulations
The preparation of the Umbulan project raises some serious issues about the
operation of the water-supply industry, even though there are some regulations
available. In the following analysis, I will focus on some important issues for a
privatization program, i.e., the institutional arrangement and PDAB's statutory authority,
financial arrangements, contractual agreement, and risk-sharing arrangements.
Institutional Arrangements and PDAB's Statutory Authority
From the early negotiation stage between the PDAB and the Consortium in
1989, there has been an indication that the PDAB does not have an important role to
play in the project-preparation process. As a representative of the provincial
government of East Java, the PDAB was fully authorized by the governor to act on
behalf of the provincial government. The role of the PDAB can be measured in the
equity and loan structure of the Joint Venture Company (JVC), as follows:
1. Equity":
Costain/Mowlem
Mott MacDonald International Rp. 20,7 billion
North West Water International
Commonwealth Development Corp. Rp. 10,3 billion
Local Contractors Rp. 10,3 billion
PDAB Rp. 72,7 billion1 2
2. Loan:
Export Credit Guarantee Department Rp. 135,0 billion
Commonwealth Development Corporation Rp. 27,0 billion
Internal Bank Syndication Rp. 60,0 billion 3
Although the PDAB has the largest share in the company, in reality, it did not
have a significant role in the project preparation. Many important tasks, such as a field
survey, a detailed engineering design, and a financial analysis, have been handed over to
the Consortium." In addition, the Northwest Water International will have a contract
for operation and maintenance of the project. The implication of this organizational
structure is that PDAB will only be the company's supervisor.
" The Bromo Consortium (January 1991). The Consortium consisted of an
Indonesian and some British companies. They are PT Duta Comfact (team leader),
Mott MacDonald International, North West Water International, and Costain/Mowlem
Umbulan Joint Venture. Later on, PT Bakrie joined the Consortium and
Costain/Mowlem left.
2 PDAB's equity will come from the British Aid, Trade, and Provision grant
(Letters from the British Embassy to BAPPENAS, dated 19/1/1990, and from
BAPPENAS to the British Embassy, dated 18 May 1991).
" The Bromo Consortium (January, 1991) and a letter from the Minister of Public
Works to the Chairman of BAPPENAS, dated 27 February 1992.
" PDAB's File, "Negotiation Between the Provincial Government of East Java and
the Bromo Consortium", 27 September 1989. Whether the PDAB realizes this or not,
the decision to let the Consortium do everything helped reduce their bargaining power
in the negotiation.
As one of the shareholders and the representative of the provincial government,
the PDAB was supposed to be able to monitor the execution of management contracts
and assure that the JVC will be operating efficiently, so that the price of the water is
affordable to all consumers. In fact, PDAB has difficulties in performing these
functions, because of its unintended limited position in the project negotiation with the
Consortium. When the MPW assisted the Consortium to finalize the project
negotiation, the role of PDAB became even less than before.
Financial Arrangements
Each party, including the central government, has put a lot of effort into
mobilizing financial resources for the project. Soon after the project was postponed in
1986, the MPW changed its project-financing strategy by suggesting that the provincial
government invite the private sector to participate in the project. By inviting the private
sector to join in a public-service provision, the MPW intended relieving the
government's financial burden. In reality, however, this cooperative arrangement has
not been implemented, because together with the Governor of East Java, the MPW
requested a Rp. 5 billion grant from BAPPENAS for land acquisition. 5
In the meantime, two important developments occurred during project
negotiations. First, the MPW had approached the World Bank and the OECF to
participate in financing the secondary-distribution systems in Pasuruan, Gresik, Sidoarjo,
" The land-ownership law forbids a non-Indonesian citizen or company from
owning the land. It was still unclear why the JVC did not want to rent the land. The
only possible explanation was that the JVC was trying to reduce operational costs as
much as possible.
and Surabaya. Second, the total project cost as of January 1991 has been increased
from Rp. 277 billion to Rp. 293 billion because of the rupiah's depreciation relative to
the pound sterling and changes in technical design and cost structure. The project cost
again escalated to Rp. 415 billion on 26 June 1992 and then decreased to Rp. 396
billion on 1 July 1992.16
The uncertainty in project costs affects the calculation of the price of water. The
agreement on the price issue was the most difficult part to be achieved by all parties
concerned. JVC will set a fixed price for water to PDAB, and the latter will sell the
water to the PDAMs. The ability of PDAB to buy the JVC's production depends upon
the ability of the PDAMs to sell the water to their customers. Of the four companies,
PDAM Surabaya is the most important buyer for PDAB, because the company will
purchase more than 50% of the JVC's total production, and more than 80% of its
customers are households.
The Umbulan Project's price of water has always been a major issue. There has
never been a clear explanation (either in the project documents or in the contractual
agreements) from the consortium concerning how they set the agreed price of water at
Rp. 638/m3 and the sales volume at 2 m3/sec. This is an unusual agreement, because
the concessionaire is usually bound with a clearly determined set of prices in the
16 PDAB's File, "Status Report on Negotiations: Cost and Financial Analysis", 19
July 1992. Between January and June 1991 the inflation rate of the Indonesian
economy in 1991 was about 9%, and the rupiah depreciation rate was 5% per year.
Finally, the engineering design and total construction cost were considered relatively
acceptable according to the standard conducted by an independent consultant at the
amount of equivalent to Rp. 295 billion or US$ 145 million (Lyonnaise des Eaux,
1992).
contract before it is signed (Lyonnaise, 1992; Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 1992;
Veljanovski, 1989). The report by Lyonnaise (1992) mentioned that even though all
parties have agreed on the price at that rate, the Consortium requires that it should still
be allowed to adjust the price by the time the project construction is finished and all
project costs are realized. It seems likely that the price will be higher.
At this price level and sales volume, the PDAB will not be able to sell the water
to their customers, because of the limited selling capacity of the four PDAMs. PDAM
Surabaya's selling capacity by 1996 will be only 1.6 m3/sec." During the negotiation
process, the MPW strongly recommended increasing PDAM Surabaya's investment plan
for the distribution network under the Surabaya Urban Development Project I project, so
that it can sell the proposed 2 m3/sec. of water. This would increase the loan financing
from Rp. 182 billion to Rp. 395 billion--an increase of Rp. 203 billion. In a 20 August,
1992 letter to the mayor, PDAM Surabaya objected to the MPW's proposal, because it
would mean the company would bear financial losses for at least five years. The
company countered by proposing to finance the larger investment proposal from the
central government's grant.
Risk-Sharing Arrangements
In the agreed Memorandum of Understanding and operational contracts, it is
obvious that the JVC will be operating with a small risk. Four major flaws embedded
in these agreements are:
17 A letter from PDAM Surabaya to the Mayor of Surabaya, dated 20 August,
1992.
1. The water-sales agreement indicates that the business risk is already minimized.
The "take-or-pay" arrangement requires the PDAB to pay the contracted sales
volume of 3 m3/sec. starting from the first year of sales contract, even if the
PDAMs are unable to sell the water to their customers. In its report, Lyonnaise
mentioned that with this arrangement, the financial cash flow of all PDAMs will
be negative, because they have to increase their debts for house-connection piped
systems. To compensate for the negative cash flow, the central government is
requested to subsidize at least Rp. 1.4 trillion for the whole project period
(Lyonnaise, 1992: Annex III.9)." If this happens, the government will make a
serious mistake--it will be shifting its subsidy from the society to a wealthy
private enterprise.
2. In the case that the quality of water is unsatisfactory to the buyer, the JVC will
terminate the supply of water and improve the water quality through some
adjustments. Should any additional costs arise due to the adjustments, the
company will augment the price of water. Therefore, there is no particular
incentive to be efficient.
3. The project is supposed to be a "Build, Operate, and Transfer" system, meaning
that when the concession agreement terminates, the project should be transferred
18 The central government subsidy has been requested by the PDAM Surabaya in
its letter to the Mayor of Surabaya, dated 20 August 1992. In this letter, PDAM
Surabaya explained that the company has to buy 2.3 m3/sec., while its selling capacity is
only 1.6 m3/sec., and must be able to construct 110 new house connections per day.
The 110 is a number that is impossible to accomplish, because the house-connection
installment work depends on consumers' requests, which currently is estimated by
PDAM Surabaya to be only 15 to 20 connections per day.
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to the provincial government; however, there is an installation renewal plan
being proposed by the Consortium in the agreement. With this arrangement, the
reinvestment program of the project will be shifted to the provincial government.
4. The Consortium requires the provincial government of East Java to guarantee the
obligations of the purchasers, the PDAB, and the four PDAMs; consequently, the
provincial government must indemnify the JVC for any breach of the terms of
the Bulk-Water Sales Agreement. In addition, the Consortium requires each
PDAM and PDAB to issue a bank guarantee in case there is a default payment.
These clauses show that the financial risk of the project is fully transferred from
the JVC to its customers and the provincial government. Risk-sharing arrangements
like these are not likely to have happened in any private or public-private partnership
project. The practice of such partnership in other countries shows that the private-sector
investments will always take the largest portion in the companies' capital structure,
because that is one of the privatization objectives--to relieve the government's financial
burden over the project (Lyonnaise, 1992; Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1992; Bos, 1991;
and Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988); therefore, the private sector usually bears most of the
operational risks. It is therefore legitimate for this sector to earn profits out of the
business operation to help compensate for the risks it is taking.
The case of the Umbulan Project suggests that the JVC has tried to reduce the
business risks to the lowest possible degree. I have analyzed the Lyonnaise report
about the project's financial arrangements and believe that they enable the JVC to earn
high monopoly profits and bear minimum financial risks.
Conclusion
No matter how great the political intervention in the project preparation process
of the Umbulan Project is, in particular, privatization of the water-supply industry, and
other utilities industries, in general, will be continued in the future. Privatization has
become an important factor of the Indonesian infrastructure development policies.
Privatization in the water-supply industry was started in the East Java province for the
first time in 1988, following the financial difficulties the central government had had in
1986. Negotiations between the public and private sectors have been going on since
1988, through a difficult, lengthy, and, yet, inconclusive process. Major reasons for this
phenomenon are: (1) an inadequate regulatory framework to arrange a privatization
project, which then leads to unfavorable institutional, financial and risk-sharing
arrangements; (2) a lack of regulation enforcement; and (3) political intervention from
the private and public sectors into the project. These three important factors have
resulted in a serious discouragement of the competitive environment of the project and
have put the productive-efficiency and public-welfare objectives at stake. Furthermore,
the unregulated natural monopoly market of the water-supply industry in Indonesia is
seen by the private sector as being an attractive opportunity to earn high profits.
Regardless of what will happen to the Umbulan Project, there is still an
opportunity to avoid such practices in other similar water-supply projects in the future.
With proper competition and adequate regulations, it is still possible to achieve social-
welfare objectives and goals of privatization in the water-supply industry. Indonesia
seems to have adequate regulations and regulatory institutions to achieve those goals for
its water-supply industry; however, the regulations are applicable only to PDAMs, and
are still inadequate to be used as a reference for the privatization of the industry. Given
the fact that Indonesia has relatively little experience in privatizing its water-supply
industry, I will make some recommendations for privatizing the industry and/or
promoting private-sector participation in the industry, in the following chapter, focusing
on the necessary regulatory framework and its institution.
CHAPTER 4
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTICIPATION
Privatization has become a world-wide phenomenon. It has become an
important economic development policy for many countries and many industries. From
the experience of the privatization of the water-supply industry in some developing and
industrial countries, I conclude that there should be a regulatory framework and
regulatory institution to guide the private sector in utilities' provision. The regulations
are needed because the private-sector is going to operate in a market characterized as a
natural monopoly. Bearing in mind that the private sector tends to maximize its profit
and that there is a high opportunity to do so in a monopoly market, the government has
an important task to create a competitive environment in order to achieve productive
efficiency, through regulations.
The regulations are needed not only to control the utilities, but also to guide
both the public and private sectors in preparing and implementing a privatization
program--no matter what form of privatization the program may take. The experience
of water-utilities privatization in Cote d'Ivoire, England, France, and the United States
indicates that specific regulations and strong governmental institutions are essential for
the success of privatization programs. In addition, as indicated in the United States and
England, the privatization program should be well understood by the public and private
sectors (Goldman and Mokuvos, 1984).
Privatization in Indonesia is a relatively new development policy, especially for
the utilities sector. The form of privatization is still limited to public-private
partnership, with a possibility to extend to full privatization, in terms of full private
financing, as experienced in some cities. The Umbulan Project, being the first public-
private partnership in the Indonesian water-supply industry, has been prepared for
implementation since 1988, but with an inadequate regulatory framework for water
supply and its privatization program. Many government officials have spent a great
deal of effort and time to prepare the project. At the provincial and local government
levels, some of the officials have been specially assigned to the PDAB to help in the
project preparation.!
Having no indication about how to reach a satisfactory agreement between the
PDAB and the Consortium in the Umbulan Project negotiation, the provincial
government of East Java requested the office of the Deputy for Regional Affairs in
BAPPENAS to help finalize the preparation of the project in the early 1991.2
BAPPENAS is responsible for development planning and is not supposed to be directly
1 This is a kind of assignment that many government officials are reluctant to
accept, because the assignment is categorized as a functional position. A functional
position like this usually is established outside the institution's formal hierarchy, and it
has no formal incentives either professionally or financially. In many cases, officials,
who return to their initial offices, take the same or sometimes lower positions, although
they performed satisfactorily on their assignments. This may be a disincentive for
government officials to perform highly in such a partnership.
2 Since the National Urban Policy Statement was passed in 1987, the office of the
Deputy for Regional Affairs has been involved in the formulation of all urban
development programs and the project-preparation stages. The tasks include the
preparation of the East Java and Bali Urban Infrastructure Development Project, and the
Surabaya Urban Development Project I.
involved in implementation. In the case of the Umbulan Project, the agency's effort has
been limited to negotiating general technical and financial issues. BAPPENAS's
involvement in the project is considered to be necessary because of its neutral
position.3 Unfortunately, BAPPENAS has been distracted with requests to take over
projects being disputed among different government agencies, which may become an
increasing problem in the future.4 This tendency should be avoided. The agency's
involvement in this project was to put the whole project in the right perspective and, in
addition, to avoid the likely possibility that the communities in the four cities will pay
an unnecessary high price for water. In July 1992, BAPPENAS decided to hire an
independent consultant to review the project proposal.
The Regulatory Institution
In Indonesia, MPW, MHA, and MOH have responsibility for the control of the
water-supply industry and provide the capital investment, institutional development
supervision, and water quality-control of the public water-supply system, respectively.
There is also PERPAMSI, which was established as a means of exchanging information
about the PDAM. The association's objective is to improve the performance of the
PDAMs. In the case of water-utility privatization, PERPAMSI would be the appropriate
institution to promote, regulate, license, and control the PDAM and its private-sector
partner. In order to perform the proposed functions, its legal status should be promoted,
3 Letter from PDAM Surabaya to the Mayor of Surabaya, dated 20 August, 1992.
4 There are at least three other public-private partnership projects of water services
being prepared in Semarang, Ujung Pandang, and Lhok Semauwe.
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by a presidential decree, to a higher level, so that its policy decision could be respected
by other government agencies. The arguments for this proposition are as follows: first,
integrated water-supply management is still difficult to implement, because coordination
among government agencies is not easy to achieve. Second, MPW should retain its
responsibility to provide capital investment for the establishment of BPAM and to
provide water services to low-income people, especially in areas where the
establishment of BPAM is still not feasible. Third, the higher status of PERPAMSI
encourages the water-supply industry to achieve a better performance, because it reflects
the central government's serious concern with the issues of public welfare at the
regional level. Fourth, PERPAMSI is a professional association of water enterprises;
therefore, its professional capability and integrity would be sufficient to represent the
provincial governments.
Suggestions for the Water-Supply Industry Regulations
The government should revise and extend its utility regulation, so that the
technical, financial and environmental standards will be applicable to public and private
(both domestic and foreign) investors. In addition, there must be a government
regulation to guide the implementation of the utilities' privatization program. The
regulation has to cover the issues of:
1. Standard technical specifications and engineering design, including standard
water-quality services for different purposes of water usage. The fact that the
quality of water for commercial use and industrial use is different requires
special consideration to be given to the technical design of a water-treatment
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plant. This standard may be used to ensure a proper investment plan for the
right purposes.
2. A standard unit of account, accounting system, and reporting for the water-
supply industry.' This standard can be used to avoid uncommon accounting
reporting, which is commonly practiced by PDAM for loan application purposes.
A standard accounting practice is extremely useful for planning purposes,
especially in making comparisons among regions.
3. Standard environmental safety measures for the construction and operation of the
water-supply system. The construction of a water reservoir and a water-
treatment plant can be environmentally hazardous to its surrounding area, and an
uncontrolled ground-water extraction may cause a serious problem of sea-water
intrusion, as experienced in Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, and many other cities in
Indonesia. This environmental standard should prevent these problems from
happening.
4. A standard formula for water pricing, and rate-structure guidelines. This
standard may include standard cost components, cost classifications, and methods
of cost assessment, which are used to set up the price of water.
5. A standard legal procedure to conduct the transfer of water rights. When a
water resource is used for two different purposes, such as the Umbulan spring
where it is used for irrigation and drinking-water supply, there could be a
s The Accounting Information System issued by the PDAM should be re-evaluated
to assure that its application will encourage efficiency in the operation of a water-supply
company.
potential dispute between the water users. The legal standard should address this
issue.
6. Standard contractual arrangements, which cover a joint-venture agreement, a
bulk-water sales agreement, concession agreement, and an operation and
maintenance agreement.
An adequate regulatory framework will help the implementation of the
government's privatization program, although its implementation is always difficult to
achieve, and it is time consuming. Detailed solutions of effective and efficient standard
operating procedures of privatization is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless,
the following suggestions may be proposed to help PERPAMSI, PDAM, private
investors, and related government institutions in preparing the privatization program,
such as:
1. Detailed procedures should be identified to help all parties conduct project
negotiations. As an example, the negotiation preparation of the Sulawesi and
Irian Jaya Urban Development Project was much faster and efficient once the
IUIDP Management Group, led by the Socioeconomic and Spatial Planning
Bureau in BAPPENAS, identified the requirements and procedures from the
similar program for East Java and Bali.'
2. Training should be provided for the PDAM and PERPAMSI staff, so that they
can understand the issue of privatization better, hence better represent the
provincial and/or local governments in the public-private partnership.
6 This recommendation is based upon the author's experience.
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3. Professional incentives and promotion criteria should be provided by the
government to encourage the PDAM staffs and related government officials to
encourage them to perform their duties at their maximum capacity. This
provision is necessary because a privatization program needs a long-term
commitment from the government officials, and project preparation and
negotiations take a long time and a lot of effort to conduct.
Conclusion
The suggested regulations provided here are meant for large-scale, water-supply
services in urban areas. For rural areas, privatization may not be feasible because of the
high capital investment required for such a service. Water utilities' regulations should
also be able to accommodate and encourage other forms of private provision of water
services, e.g. water vendor, cooperatives, and other options of privatization forms, such
as management contract and leasing. Further studies about these forms would help
policy makers to formulate a comprehensive and practical regulatory framework.
The suggestions mentioned above are also meant to help all concerned parties to
prepare and negotiate private projects in the water-supply services. Regulations can be
useful if all parties have a strong commitment to carry out the purpose of utilities,
which is to serve the community. Therefore, regulations not only ensure the attainment
of privatization and public-welfare objectives, but also commit the public agencies to
certain responsibilities and duties towards the private operators. Clear and fair
regulation can provide a stable environment for business to operate in the utilities
sector.
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